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SECTION 1: GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION

1.1. APPLICABILITY. This issuance:

   a. Applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the “DoD Components”).

   b. Does not apply to any DoD effort to provide emergency foreign disaster assistance pursuant to a commander’s immediate response authority, as established in Section 404 or 2561 of Title 10, U.S.C.

   c. Does not apply to programs administered by DoD pursuant to Title 22, U.S.C.

1.2. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

   a. AM&E of security cooperation programs will:

      (1) Foster accurate and transparent reporting to key stakeholders on the outcomes and sustainability of security cooperation and track, understand, and improve returns on DoD security cooperation investments.

      (2) Identify and disseminate best practices and lessons learned for security cooperation implementation to inform decisions about security cooperation policy, plans, programs, program management, resources, and the security cooperation workforce.

   b. DoD will maintain a robust AM&E program in support of DoD security cooperation efforts, including:

      (1) Conducting initial assessments to inform initiative design and establish a baseline against which to track progress in advance of all significant security cooperation initiatives.

      (2) Developing an initiative design document (IDD) with applicable elements, to guide all significant security cooperation initiatives.

      (3) Monitoring progress of significant security cooperation initiatives toward desired outcomes by tracking inputs (e.g., funding, manpower, and expertise), then determining whether programmatic milestones are achieved within anticipated timeframes, budgets, and outcomes, including whether desired results or effects are occurring within the timeframe anticipated.

      (4) Conducting centralized independent and rigorous evaluations of significant security cooperation initiatives to examine their relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability.

   c. AM&E will be integrated into security cooperation planning at all stages.
d. Lessons learned derived from evaluations across DoD will be developed and disseminated to inform future security cooperation planning and resource decisions.

e. Collaborative evaluations across DoD Components as well as with other U.S. Government agencies and international partners should facilitate mutual learning and reduce costs.

f. AM&E practices will conform with applicable laws and Presidential directives.

g. Based on resources allocated for security cooperation programs and activities, DoD will ensure sufficient funds are made available in accordance with DoD strategy, administration policy, and international best practices, to support:

   (1) The conduct of centralized independent evaluations and dissemination of lessons learned.

   (2) Training and technical assistance to the security cooperation workforce for conducting and supporting AM&E functions.

   (3) AM&E policy implementation by DoD Components.

h. Unclassified summaries of the evaluation of DoD security cooperation activities will be made publically available, unless it is determined that disclosure of the summary information could be expected to cause foreseeable harm to the United States or a partner nation.

   i. These practices are applied to all appropriate security cooperation activities in line with guidance and standards identified in this issuance.
SECTION 2: RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)). The USD(P) is responsible for the oversight and management of the security cooperation AM&E enterprise. In this capacity, the USD(P):

a. Formulates policies and processes to standardize and synchronize DoD Component AM&E efforts.

b. Maintains and oversees a centralized evaluation office to coordinate and facilitate the conduct of independent evaluations of significant security cooperation initiatives and to provide DoD-wide guidance, tools, and templates on all aspects of AM&E, by:

   (1) Serving as a resource to all DoD Components for technical assistance and subject matter expertise.

   (2) Facilitating the timely tracking, follow-up, and reporting of evaluations.

   (3) Storing and disseminating, across DoD Components, lessons learned derived from evaluations, including briefings of evaluation findings, best practices, and recommendations to relevant DoD Components, before program planning for the following fiscal year.

c. Annually determines priorities for independent evaluations and, in consultation with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA); the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense, sets the budget and resource allocations for AM&E functions. Allocations will support:

   (1) The conduct of independent evaluations for priority security cooperation initiatives and dissemination of lessons learned.

   (2) Training and technical assistance to the security cooperation workforce for conducting and supporting AM&E functions.

   (3) Additional resources, as needed, to support DoD Component AM&E policy implementation.

d. Reviews individual evaluation summaries and the comprehensive set of summaries for potential public release on the DoD website and determines if the summary information could be expected to cause foreseeable harm to the United States or an allied or partner nation.

e. Represents DoD security cooperation AM&E goals, policies, and priorities to external audiences, including interagency and international partners.

f. Ensures that security cooperation activities implemented by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy are appropriately assessed and monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a global theater security cooperation information...
management system (G-TSCMIS). Conducts evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions, and ensures such evaluations are in compliance with standards identified in Paragraph 3.5.

g. Incorporates relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and applies lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

h. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) in the development of assessments and IDDs for significant security cooperation initiatives.

2.2. DIRECTOR, DSCA. Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the Director, DSCA:

a. Establishes standards for AM&E training within the security cooperation workforce.

b. In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the CJCS, and other DoD Components, as appropriate, ensures resource allocations are sufficient to support a security cooperation workforce that is appropriately sized, properly assigned, and possesses the requisite skills, training, and resources to implement DoD’s AM&E policy.

c. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDDs for significant security cooperation initiatives.

d. Makes relevant source documents available and participates, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

e. Develops and maintains data management capabilities for AM&E, including collection, retention, and appropriate dissemination of initial assessments, IDDs, and evaluation reports from all DoD Components.

f. Manages the development and operation of a G-TSCMIS to support planning and monitoring of security cooperation activities, and enters appropriate data into the system.

g. Incorporates relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and applies lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

2.3. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics:

a. Ensures that security cooperation activities implemented by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (e.g., collaboration in science and technology, research, development, test, and evaluation, acquisition, in-service, and logistics support (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements) are appropriately assessed and

SECTION 2. RESPONSIBILITIES
monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a G-TSCMIS. Conducts evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions in compliance with the standards in Paragraph 3.5.

b. Incorporates relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and applies lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

c. Makes relevant source documents available and participates, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

d. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDDs for significant security cooperation initiatives.

2.4. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Defense:

a. Coordinates with the USD(P) on budget levels, program adjustments, and allocations to ensure the availability of sufficient resources to support security cooperation AM&E efforts.

b. Incorporates relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and applies lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

c. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDDs for significant security cooperation initiatives.

d. Makes relevant source documents available and participates, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

2.5. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:

a. Ensures that defense intelligence collection and analysis is sufficient to support security cooperation AM&E, particularly for significant security cooperation initiatives.

b. Ensures security cooperation activities implemented by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence are appropriately assessed and monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a G-TSCMIS. Conducts evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions, in compliance with the standards in Paragraph 3.5.

c. Incorporates relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and applies lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.
d. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDDs for significant security cooperation initiatives.

e. Makes relevant source documents available and participates, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

2.6. DIRECTOR OF COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation:

a. Provides input to the USD(P) on annual priorities for centralized, independent evaluation.

b. Utilizes the assessments, evaluations, and DoD Components’ program and budget submissions to inform deliberations and programmatic alternatives regarding security cooperation during program review.

c. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDDs for significant security cooperation initiatives.

2.7. DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. The Deputy Chief management Officer of the Department of Defense maintains the open.defense.gov Website and ensures that unclassified summaries of centralized evaluations, approved for public release by the USD(P), are posted to the website and available within 90 days of completion.

2.8. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies:

a. Ensure that security cooperation workforce personnel under their authority have the requisite skills and training to implement AM&E policies, in consultation with the Director, DSCA.

b. Implement resource decisions, in coordination with the Director, DSCA, and other DoD Components, as appropriate, to ensure the security cooperation workforce is appropriately sized, properly assigned, and possess the requisite skills, training, and resources to implement AM&E policies.

c. Ensure DoD-wide policies on AM&E are incorporated into DoD Component security cooperation plans, policies, doctrine, and guidance and reflected in DoD Component requirements and resourcing.

d. Make available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDDs for significant security cooperation initiatives.
e. Ensure security cooperation activities implemented by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies are assessed and monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a G-TSCMIS. Conduct evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions in compliance with the standards in Paragraph 3.5.

f. Incorporate relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and apply lessons learned and best practices from monitoring and evaluations to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

g. Make relevant source documents available and participate, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

2.9. CJCS. The CJCS:

a. Develops and maintains joint security cooperation doctrine consistent with DoD’s AM&E policy.

b. Provides input to the USD(P) on annual priorities for centralized, independent evaluation.

c. Based on input from the GCCs, identifies shortfalls in mission execution, gaps in preparation and training, and other key personnel issues that may hinder the implementation of DoD’s AM&E policy and provides to the Director, DSCA, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments recommended mitigations to address shortfalls.

d. Ensures security cooperation activities implemented by the Joint Staff are appropriately assessed and monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a G-TSCMIS. Conducts evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions in compliance with the standards in Paragraph 3.5.

e. Stores and disseminates lessons learned derived from evaluations through the joint lessons learned information system portal.

f. Incorporates relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and applies lessons learned and best practices to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

g. Makes relevant source documents available and participates, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

h. Makes available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support the GCCs in the development of assessments and IDDs for significant security cooperation initiatives.
2.10. **GCCS.** The GCCs:

   a. Identify significant security cooperation initiatives for the purposes of assessment, monitoring, and independent evaluation in country-specific security cooperation sections of the theater campaign plan.

   b. For all significant security cooperation initiatives, ensure assessments and monitoring are undertaken in support of IDD execution. This includes:

      (1) Leading initial assessment efforts.

      (2) Facilitating participation of relevant subject matter experts and other appropriate participants in assessing, developing IDDs, and monitoring implementation.

      (3) Developing the formulation of IDDs for all significant initiatives as outlined in Paragraph 3.3.

      (4) Monitoring of all significant initiatives as outlined in Paragraph 3.4.

      (5) Submitting to the Director, DSCA, all initial assessments and IDDs for new security cooperation initiatives, and retaining such materials for three years after completion of the security cooperation initiative.

   c. Identify shortfalls in the size, preparation, training, and staffing of personnel assigned to the Combatant Command with AM&E responsibilities and recommend mitigations to the CJCS.

   d. Ensure security cooperation initiatives are appropriately assessed and monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a G-TSCMIS. Conduct and support evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions in compliance with the standards in Paragraph 3.5.

   e. Incorporate relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and apply lessons learned and best practices to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

   f. Make relevant source documents available and participate, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).

   g. Direct the security cooperation offices of U.S. Embassies to support AM&E functions and activities, as appropriate.

2.11. **FUNCTIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDERS.** The functional Combatant Commanders:

   a. Make available subject matter expertise, as appropriate, to support GCCs in the development of assessments and IDDs for significant security cooperation initiatives.
b. Ensure security cooperation activities implemented by functional Combatant Commands are appropriately assessed and monitored, including by ensuring that appropriate data is entered into a G-TSCMIS. Conduct evaluations as needed to inform security cooperation management decisions in compliance with the standards in Paragraph 3.5.

c. Incorporate relevant evaluation recommendations as outlined in Paragraph 3.5.f. and apply lessons learned and best practices to make adjustments, as needed, to policy, program, and resource allocation decisions.

d. Make relevant source documents available and participate, as appropriate, in support of the independent evaluations directed by the USD(P).
3.1 GENERAL FRAMEWORK.

a. DoD AM&E will be consistent with U.S. Government and international standards and best practices.

b. DoD will maintain a hybrid approach to management of AM&E efforts, whereby, in general, assessment and monitoring will be a decentralized effort based on the principles and guidelines established in this instruction and other directives, policies, and law; and evaluations at the strategic level will be centralized and overseen by the USD(P).

c. When possible, DoD should align its AM&E efforts with those of host nation counterparts, other donors, and implementing partners. This should lessen the overall data-collection burden and help promote security cooperation effectiveness.

d. Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation each serve a separate function at distinct points in the security cooperation planning and implementation cycle (see Figure 1).

e. AM&E is required for all significant security cooperation initiatives. Such initiatives are generally led by the GCCs and are often articulated as specific lines of effort in the country-specific security cooperation sections of a theater campaign plan. Significant security cooperation initiatives involve the application of multiple security cooperation tools and programs, which may be overseen and managed by various DoD Components and the Department of State, over multiple years to realize a country- or region-specific objective or functional objective (e.g., maritime security or counterterrorism).

f. Initiatives specifically designated as pilot programs (i.e., testing new concepts and approaches to security cooperation to assess their effectiveness and applicability to broader requirements) should be appropriately planned, designed, monitored, and evaluated before being replicated or expanded.

g. Accountability and learning are the primary purposes of AM&E and will shape efforts to leverage security cooperation more effectively in support of defense objectives in the near, medium, and long terms. AM&E indicates returns on investment, allows policymakers to identify and improve or eliminate ineffective initiatives, and provides credible information in support of policy and legislation. AM&E will help DoD understand what security cooperation methods work and why, and apply lessons learned and best practices to inform security cooperation resources and policy decisions.
3.2. INITIAL ASSESSMENT STANDARDS. Initial assessments are required before all significant security cooperation initiatives to inform IDDs, and are encouraged before all security cooperation activities. The initial assessment provides an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements to inform security cooperation planning and implementation. Assessments identify potential risks to initiative success to help planners develop risk-mitigation strategies.

a. Initial assessments describe host nation willingness and propensity to implement and sustain assistance, improve institutional capacity, and build capabilities in the context of country or other relevant objectives, and to identify requirements, gaps, and potential risks.

b. Analysis derived from an initial assessment should directly inform an IDD and related country plans in appropriate sections. Initial assessments should include the following elements:

1. The extent to which an allied or partner nation shares relevant strategic objectives with the United States, as well as a partner’s current ability to contribute to missions to address
such shared objectives, based on detailed holistic analysis of relevant partner capabilities such as through application of the doctrine, organizational structure, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy framework referenced in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, as established by CJCS Instruction 3170.01I.

(2) Analysis of potential risks, including assumptions and possible consequences of implementing and not implementing the initiative, program, or activity.

(3) Information to inform initiative design, including available contextual data, baselines, suggested objectives, indicators and milestones, as well as recommendations on what can be achieved within a given timeframe with anticipated resources.

(4) Analysis of relevant environmental, economic, political, sociological, cultural, and other conditions that may directly impact the implementation of the initiative in a specific country.

(5) The feasibility of achieving successful outcomes based on a partner’s political willingness to pursue the desired outcome; its absorptive capacity, including the extent to which a partner can support, employ, and sustain assistance independently; its political stability; and its respect for rule of law and human rights.

(6) Analysis of other related U.S. Government, non-governmental, and international government organizations, and other stakeholder efforts that are underway or planned, including how the security cooperation initiative may complement or compete with other programs or activities.

(7) Other relevant information, assessments, completed evaluations and related documents that provide context for the initial assessment process.

3.3. SECURITY COOPERATION IDD STANDARDS. An IDD is required of all significant security cooperation initiatives. The IDD should be developed through a deliberate and inclusive process, informed by the opportunities and risks identified in the initial assessment, to create a comprehensive document. In many cases, consulting the host nation can be helpful in the development of the IDD.

a. The IDD should increase the likelihood that security cooperation investments are targeted, measurable, and effectively implemented. To that end, it provides an overview of the activities and authorities to be applied in a synchronized manner to achieve the planned security cooperation outcome. Specifically, IDDs should include:

(1) Clear linkage to goals or objectives in the theater campaign plan or other higher-level guidance.

(2) Problem statement, derived from the initial assessment, which is a clear description of the issue or challenge the initiative seeks to address. Also known as the rationale, the problem statement provides the basis and reasons for implementing a security cooperation initiative.
(3) A comprehensive performance management section that includes:

(a) A logic framework for the initiative that maps goals and specific, measurable, achievable, relevant/results-oriented, and time-bound objectives to the activities necessary to achieve desired changes. The logic framework visually describes activities and the planned process of contributing to initiative goals and achieving objectives.

(b) Indicators and milestones, ideally with baselines and targets, tied to the specific, measurable, achievable, relevant/results-oriented, and time-bound objectives that quantitatively or qualitatively measure the outputs and outcomes of the security cooperation initiative toward achieving stated objectives.

(c) A theory of change, intended to make implicit assumptions more explicit, which describes why certain actions will produce a desired change in a given context, and clearly states what the intended outcome of the initiative will be and how it will be achieved.

(4) Guidance to relevant stakeholders on how their security cooperation tools and activities should contribute to the security cooperation initiative and expectations regarding their role in supporting AM&E efforts. It should also include data-collection details, parameters, frequency, and responsibility; how results will be used and communicated; and recommendations on when to evaluate the program.

b. IDDs should be updated as circumstances change, maintained and retained by the relevant DoD Component, and shared among initiative and AM&E stakeholders.

3.4. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING STANDARDS.
Performance monitoring for security cooperation will vary depending on the initiative or activity. Parameters and expectations for monitoring of indicators or milestones at pre-determined intervals throughout implementation should be clearly outlined in the performance management section of the IDD.

a. Monitoring may be focused at different levels, such as:

(1) Output monitoring at the implementation level of specific deliverables such as goods and services to document progress during initiative implementation (e.g., number of training events delivered). Output monitoring may be particularly useful to program managers and implementers.

(2) Outcome monitoring at the leadership or management level of the results of security cooperation initiatives (e.g., was capacity built based on our training? Did the partner nation successfully employ the DoD-provided system in support of the intended mission?). Outcome monitoring may be particularly useful to GCCs and organizations with policy, oversight, and management responsibilities.

b. DoD will rely on existing data collection processes managed by DSCA, the GCCs, and other DoD Components for all security cooperation activities. Data collected for each indicator should be organized in a systematic way to facilitate analysis and tracking trends to support
program-management decisions. Although data should be reported at planned intervals, it may be modified to reflect the situation on the ground.

c. Monitoring, which also may include site visits, should also review and identify any changes in the operational and strategic environment since the initial assessment and identify any unforeseen challenges that impact initiative execution and implementation.

3.5. EVALUATION STANDARDS.

a. The USD(P) will maintain an office responsible for leading a centralized effort for independent evaluations to measure the effectiveness and impact of significant security cooperation initiatives toward meeting expected outcomes. Evaluations will be primarily conducted at the strategic level using the appropriate methodology based on context, available resources, and data. Standards for evaluations will be based on the American Evaluation Association and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The four principles in Paragraphs 3.5.a. (1) through (4) should be incorporated into all evaluations conducted by DoD.

(1) Usefulness: The information, ideas, and recommendations generated by evaluations should serve a need or answer specific strategic questions for DoD.

(2) Independence: Evaluators should be able to gather and analyze data and information freely and follow rigorous and scientifically valid methodologies. All evaluations should be free from any interference from the commissioning unit or management.

(3) Methodological and Analytical Rigor: Evaluations should be evidence-based, relying on verifiable data and information gathered using the standards of professional evaluation organizations. Both quantitative and qualitative methods can be rigorous and are usually required to answer evaluation questions.

(4) Cost Effectiveness: The expected benefits from a security cooperation evaluation should be a value greater than, or equal to, the resources expended on the evaluation. Cost effectiveness should also be weighed in determining how the evaluation will be used.

b. Evaluations of other security cooperation activities may be commissioned by DoD Components and other stakeholders to improve performance or answer key management questions. These evaluations should generally follow the standards identified within this section.

c. Joint or collaborative evaluations are strongly encouraged when they:

(1) Facilitate mutual learning or reduce costs.

(2) Are preceded by a memorandum of understanding that outlines costs, expectations, roles, and responsibilities.

d. Security cooperation evaluations will follow the internationally and U.S. Government-recognized ethical standards in dealing with stakeholders and other informants, including:
(1) Rights of Human Subjects: Evaluations will comply with 32 CFR Part 219 and DoDI 3216.02 to the extent those provisions apply.

(2) Sensitivity: Evaluators should be sensitive to the gender, beliefs, manners, and customs of people as well as organizational structures and hierarchies as they conduct their research in culturally appropriate fashion.

(3) Privacy and Confidentiality of Information: The privacy and confidentiality of information should be maintained. If sensitive information is involved, the identity of the informants must be protected in accordance with the Privacy Act and DoD information policies as applicable.

(4) Conflict of Interest: Evaluators should strive to eliminate biases or vested interest in the evaluation outcomes. Evaluators or contracted firms should recuse themselves from an evaluation if they played any role in planning or supporting the execution of the program or could be perceived to benefit from the program being evaluated.

e. Final evaluation reports should be clear and concise. The reports should be readable and, as far as possible, the language should be simple, active, familiar, and culturally and politically sensitive. In accordance with U.S. Government best practices, reports should:

(1) Include data, findings, conclusions, and recommendations: Such information can be collected by the evaluators or collected during monitoring. Findings represent the interpretation of data. Conclusions are the judgments that evaluators make about the initiative’s performance, outcomes, and impacts based on findings. Recommendations for how future performance could be improved follow from the findings and conclusions.

(2) Be organized around evaluation questions, with findings, conclusions, and recommendations addressing each of the major questions. Reports should include these elements:

(a) Executive summary of evaluation.

(b) Introduction and background.

(c) Description of program or activity (e.g., including budget, beginning and end dates).

(d) Purpose of evaluation.

(e) Evaluation questions.

(f) Description of the evaluation design, including data collection methods used, scope, and methodology.

(g) A statement about the time period of the evaluation work performance, time spent in the field, who did the work, and the composition of the team.
(h) Strengths and limitations of the collected data.

(i) Conclusions: The overall conclusions synthesize findings from the questions asked and should be logical inferences based on findings of each question.

(j) Recommendations: Findings that require corrective action will need a recommendation directed at management officials who have the authority to act on it. Recommendations should state what needs to be corrected or achieved without being prescriptive. They should flow naturally from the findings and conclusions.

(k) Appendices for additional documents, including evaluation scope of work/terms of reference.

(3) Be accompanied by a briefing by the evaluators with key stakeholders to review results and debrief on evaluation process and procedures.

f. To promote transparency of DoD’s security cooperation programs, completed evaluations by the centralized evaluation office will include a separate summary for posting on DoD’s public website (www.open.defense.gov) unless the USD(P), in consultation with other DoD Components, determines that disclosure of the summary information could be expected to cause foreseeable harm to the United States or a partner nation. The summary of the evaluation should generally be no more than 2-4 pages and should include:

(1) The title of the evaluation and a brief overview of the programs or activities involved and relevant context.

(2) The purpose of the evaluation and questions addressed.

(3) The methodology used and its scope and limitation.

(4) Key findings generally organized by evaluation questions.

(5) Conclusions and, if appropriate, recommendations.

g. Consistent with AM&E best practices and to promote accountability and the usefulness of evaluation results, within 30 days of finalizing an evaluation report the relevant stakeholders should prepare a memorandum responding to the evaluation to the USD(P), indicating:

(1) Concurrence or non-concurrence in evaluation recommendations (e.g., do the relevant management officials agree with recommendations outlined in the report and, if not, why?).

(2) A plan for compliance with the recommendations (e.g., how will management implement or act on recommendations from the report? What changes will be made?).

(3) A timeframe for compliance (e.g., when does management expect the recommendations to be implemented fully?).
(4) A point of contact for implementing recommendations (e.g., who will be in charge of implementation?).
GLOSSARY

G.1. ACRONYMS

AM&E  assessment, monitoring, and evaluation
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DSCA  Defense Security Cooperation Agency
GCC  Geographic Combatant Commander
G-TSCMIS  Global-Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System
IDD  initiative design document
USD(P)  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

G.2. DEFINITIONS.  Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.

accountability.  Obligation to demonstrate, deliver on, and report on what has been achieved in compliance with agreed rules, policies, and standards.

assessment.  Systematic analysis to provide an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements to inform security cooperation planning and implementation. Assessments are generally conducted in advance of security cooperation activities, but may be repeated to update analysis and identify mid-course corrections of security cooperation activities.

country-specific security cooperation section.  A section of the theater campaign plan in which the GCCs articulate their intent to apply time, money, and effort through security cooperation programs in a specific country to further U.S. defense objectives or set the theater for a potential contingency in their campaign plan. Country-specific security cooperation sections serve as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of security cooperation at the country level, and inform and are informed by corresponding integrated country strategies. Each country-specific security cooperation section identifies specific lines of effort that:

Represent the significant security cooperation initiatives planned for the country.

Articulate specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound objectives in support of such initiatives.

effectiveness.  The extent to which a security cooperation initiative has attained its objectives or intended results.
efficiency. A measure of how economically resources (e.g., funds, expertise, time) are used to achieve results.

evaluation. A systematic collection and analysis of information and evidence about the characteristics and outcomes of an ongoing or completed initiative, and its design, implementation, and results. Evaluations determine relevance, value, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact as a basis for improving effectiveness and to inform decision makers regarding future plans, programs, and activities. Evaluation, distinct from assessment and monitoring, focuses on documenting the achievement of outcomes and results and in some cases the value of continuing the investment.

evaluation recommendations. Proposals based on evaluation findings and conclusions that are aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, quality, or processes of a security cooperation program or activity.

indicator. Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the anticipated changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a security cooperation actor. Two types of indicators are relevant for security cooperation AM&E efforts:

  Output - good or service delivered.

  Outcome - condition achieved as a result of outputs.

initial assessment. Information collected before or at the start of an initiative that provides a basis for planning, monitoring, or evaluating subsequent progress or impact.

IDD. A comprehensive document that specifies the specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound objectives, theory of change, and performance management plan for a security cooperation initiative.

joint evaluations. Joint or collaborative evaluations are evaluations undertaken by two or more stakeholders involved in a security cooperation initiative, either within DoD or between DoD and other U.S. Government departments, agencies, or other stakeholders, including the host nation.

milestone. A scheduled event that indicates the completion of a major task of a program. Milestones are observable and enable the measurement of the progress of a program.

monitoring. A continuous process designed to provide regular feedback on the extent to which expected outputs and outcomes are being achieved to inform decisions or corrective actions. In general, results measured in monitoring are the direct and near-term consequences of initiative activities that provide opportunities to validate the theory of change throughout implementation and an early indication of the likelihood that expected results will be attained.

objective. A statement of a desired result that meets the criteria of being specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound.
output. The direct, tangible results of initiatives. A deliverable or product, good, or service directly resulting from a security cooperation initiative or activity, such as the number of training events and the number of unit members trained. These early work products often serve as documentation of progress during implementation and monitoring.

outcome. The results achieved by initiatives. Some outcomes of interest for security cooperation are whether partner capability is being built to meet standards, to what extent, and whether it is achieved within a desired time frame. Three types of outcomes include:

- Short-term. Immediate effects of the initiative or activities often focused on the knowledge and attitudes of the intended audience.
- Intermediate. Intermediate effects on behavior or normative or policy changes.
- Long-term (also impact). Long-term, cumulative effects of interventions over time on what they ultimately aim to change (e.g., capabilities, security conditions).

performance management plan. A specific plan to manage the process of monitoring, evaluating, and analyzing progress toward achieving results over the life of a program.

pilot program. An innovative program conducted on a small scale to examine its model, implementation, effects, and outcomes to determine whether it should be replicated on a larger scale or expanded in a different environment.

security cooperation offices. DoD organizations permanently located in foreign countries and assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation management functions in accordance with Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Security cooperation offices may include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, and Offices of Defense and Military Cooperation designated to perform security cooperation functions. They do not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct security cooperation activities, such as mobile training and education teams or operational units.

security cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This also includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.

security cooperation funding. Allocated funds, including both base and overseas contingency operations appropriations, to any program or activity that is intended primarily for the purpose of security cooperation. This category includes programs and activities used to train and equip partners; provide technical, educational, financial, or humanitarian assistance; conduct military-to-military or defense civilian contacts, engagements, or exchanges; provide support to operations conducted by partner nations; and conduct other relevant bilateral and multilateral activities.
Security cooperation funding does not include programs or activities with a primary purpose other than security cooperation, even where there are secondary security cooperation benefits, such as combined exercises or combined training primarily intended to improve U.S. military readiness. Covered funding is limited to those funds used for incremental execution costs and program management costs, and do not include costs associated with manning, training, and equipping force elements used to implement such activities.

**significant security cooperation initiative.** The series of activities, projects, and programs planned as a unified, multi-year effort to achieve a single desired outcome or set of related outcomes. Such initiatives are generally planned by the geographic Combatant Commands and involve the application of multiple security cooperation tools over multiple years to realize a country- or region-specific objective or functional objective as articulated in the country-specific security cooperation sections of a theater campaign plan.

**sustainability.** The partner country’s ability to maintain capability, capacity, or other results of a security cooperation intervention at the desired level of effectiveness and efficiency.

**theory of change.** A statement of expectations regarding the process by which planned activities will lead to stated objectives. It articulates assumptions and plans about how and why a set of activities and actions are expected to evolve in the future, including causal linkages through which early and intermediate outcomes will lead to long-term results.
REFERENCES

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01I, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS),” January 23, 2015
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 32, Part 219
Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Delegations of Authority,” November 30, 2006
DoD Instruction 3216.02, Protection of Human Subjects and Adherance to Ethical Standards in DoD-Supported Research, November 8, 2011
United States Code, Title 10
United States Code, Title 22
United States Code, Title 32
United States Code, Title 50

1 U.S. Government personnel may review by contacting the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation.