DETERMINATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION

Under the authority delegated to me by the Secretary of Defense, I have determined that the following information is exempt from disclosure under Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)) because it meets the requirements for exemption under 10 U.S.C. § 130e:

Vulnerability assessments performed on Defense Industrial Base “critical assets,” which are deemed essential to the execution of military operations, and information that could be used to publically identify those assets.

Date: 11/29/2017

Michael L. Rhodes
Director of Administration
STATEMENT OF THE BASIS FOR THE DETERMINATION BY THE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION

In accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 130e, I reviewed information provided to me by the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security regarding DODIG-2012-064 report: “Vulnerability and Risk Assessments Needed to Protect Defense Industrial Base Critical Assets,” March 13, 2012. I have determined that certain information within this report relating to Defense Industrial Base (DIB) critical assets qualifies as DOD critical infrastructure security information (DCRIT). As defined by 10 U.S.C. § 130e, DCRIT includes:

“…sensitive but unclassified information that, if disclosed, would reveal vulnerabilities in Department of Defense critical infrastructure that, if exploited, would likely result in the significant disruption, destruction, or damage of or to Department of Defense operations, property, or facilities, including information regarding the securing and safeguarding of explosives, hazardous chemicals, or pipelines, related to critical infrastructure or protected systems owned or operated by or on behalf of the Department of Defense, including vulnerability assessments prepared by or on behalf of the Department of Defense, explosives safety information (including storage and handling), and other site-specific information on or relating to installation security.”

Adversaries of the United States are frequently attempting to identify, presumably for eventual targeting and exploitation, Defense Industrial Base critical assets, which the department defines as “specific entit[ies] that [are] of such extraordinary importance that [their] incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of a nation to continue to function effectively.” Therefore, publically identifying and releasing vulnerability assessments of these assets could result in the “significant disruption, destruction, or damage of or to” departmental operations.

Further, even releasing only identifying information about critical DIB assets exposes them to an increased risk of attack by those intent on significantly disrupting, destroying, or damaging departmental operations. Similarly, releasing the criteria the department uses to designate DIB assets as critical would provide an adversary with the ability to identify them. Releasing the number of critical assets or the number of vulnerability assessments performed, when combined with other information in the report, furthermore, would enable an adversary to narrowly focus its research and more easily identify the critical DIB assets. Therefore, such information that could lead to the identification of critical assets qualifies as DCRIT as well.

I considered the public interest in the disclosure of this information and weighed it against the risk of harm that might result if it were disclosed. I have determined that the public interest does not outweigh the protection of this information. Therefore, it should be exempt from public disclosure.