DETERMINATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION

Under the authority delegated to me by the Secretary of Defense, I have determined that the following information is exempt from disclosure under Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)) because it meets the requirements for exemption under 10 U.S.C. § 130e:

Department of Defense information pertaining to TRIDENT II D5 missile convoy routes on Naval Base Kitsap, Bangor, WA and the identification and capabilities of the nuclear weapons incident response force based there.

The statement of the basis for this determination is at Tab A.

Date: 1·21·2016

Michael L. Rhodes
Director of Administration
In accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 130e, I reviewed information provided to me by the Department of the Navy concerning TRIDENT II D5 missile convoy routes on Naval Base Kitsap, Bangor, WA and the identification and capabilities of the nuclear weapon incident response force based there and determined that it qualifies as Department of Defense (DoD) critical infrastructure security information (CISI). As defined by 10 U.S.C. § 130e, CISI includes:

“…sensitive but unclassified information that, if disclosed, would reveal vulnerabilities in Department of Defense critical infrastructure that, if exploited, would likely result in the significant disruption, destruction, or damage of or to Department of Defense operations, property, or facilities, including information regarding the securing and safeguarding of explosives, hazardous chemicals, or pipelines, related to critical infrastructure or protected systems owned or operated by or on behalf of the Department of Defense, including vulnerability assessments prepared by or on behalf of the Department of Defense, explosives safety information (including storage and handling), and other site-specific information on or relating to installation security.”

This information meets the definition of CISI because it pertains to the path of movement of TRIDENT II D5 missiles from storage facilities to loading platforms on the naval base and how the government could respond to a nuclear weapon incident there. If disclosed, it would reveal vulnerabilities that, if exploited, would likely endanger public health and safety and would likely result in significant disruption, destruction, or damage of or to DoD operations, property, or facilities.

To be clear, the missile convoy routes qualifying as CISI are completely on Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor; this determination does not include any missile convoy routes off of this military installation. Examples of TRIDENT II D5 missile convoy route information include the names of streets used to transport TRIDENT II D5 missiles from onshore storage facilities to the waterfront restricted area, and characteristics of the terrain surrounding roads used for the convoy route. If exploited, this information could provide potential attackers with information that would aid them in the execution of an attack on Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, thereby creating a threat to national security, the health and safety of DoD personnel, and the health and safety of the public in the surrounding community.

Incident response force information includes the identification of initial response force personnel and the location and capabilities of incident response force personnel, assets, and equipment. Incident response force personnel information, including names, titles, and organizational relationships, when compiled and if exploited, could provide an adversary with a tactical advantage in advance, during, or in the immediate aftermath of an attack. Also, information relating to incident response force assets and equipment could provide a potential adversary with information that would allow it to determine how, when, and where to most
effectively execute an attack. Thus, the release of information pertaining to the incident response
force on Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor would be counter-productive to its purpose and intent, which
includes the provision of security to prevent an attack, and would create a threat to national
security, the health and safety of DoD personnel, and the health and safety of the public in the
surrounding community.

I also considered the public interest in the disclosure of this information; specifically, the
interest of the residents living near Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, and have weighed this against the
harm that would likely result if it the subject information was to be disclosed.

The public interest in the disclosure of information pertaining to TRIDENT II D5 missile
convoy routes and the incident response force at Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific, Naval Base
Kitsap-Bangor is not wholly insignificant in this instance; however, the harm that would likely
result from disclosure is very serious and extremely significant. Therefore, the public interest
consideration in the disclosure of this information does not outweigh preventing the disclosure of
the information.